Add attack surface audit artifacts
Some checks failed
CI / Validate (pull_request) Has been cancelled
Some checks failed
CI / Validate (pull_request) Has been cancelled
- Add advisory, entrypoint, and candidate scan outputs - Capture dependency intelligence and cross-service attack surface notes
This commit is contained in:
parent
a35a757622
commit
47a5adca90
26 changed files with 2807 additions and 0 deletions
17
piolium/attack-surface/variant-summary.md
Normal file
17
piolium/attack-surface/variant-summary.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Phase 12 Variant Summary
|
||||
|
||||
Variant analysis reviewed surviving findings in `piolium/findings-draft/` and searched code/attack-surface artifacts for sibling sources, sinks, and flow shapes. `piolium/attack-pattern-registry.json` was not present, so no registry update could be made.
|
||||
|
||||
## Confirmed variants
|
||||
|
||||
1. `piolium/findings-draft/p12-001-unauthenticated-nats-market-event-injection.md` — expands the confirmed unauthenticated `flow.news` producer-impersonation flaw to the other trusted market/derived NATS subjects consumed by API, compute, and candles.
|
||||
2. `piolium/findings-draft/p12-002-candles-jetstream-redelivery-duplicates-derived-candles.md` — same JetStream side-effects-before-ack idempotency gap as compute, present in the candles worker.
|
||||
|
||||
## Searches performed
|
||||
|
||||
- HTML injection/XSS: only `apps/web/app/terminal.tsx` uses `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` and the regex sanitizer pattern.
|
||||
- Admin proxy: only `apps/web/app/api/admin/synthetic/*` injects a server bearer token into public Next route proxying.
|
||||
- WebSocket auth/origin: unauthenticated upgrade pattern is centralized in `services/api/src/index.ts`; no additional WS servers found.
|
||||
- NATS producer trust: API consumer binding matrix and worker subscriptions show additional subjects accepting schema-only messages from the unauthenticated broker.
|
||||
- JetStream redelivery/idempotency: candles worker matches the compute side-effect-before-ack shape.
|
||||
- Infrastructure exposure: root compose exposure finding remains centralized to root `docker-compose.yml`; production compose does not publish infra ports directly in the same way.
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue