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islandflow/piolium/attack-surface/deep-probe-summary.md
dirtydishes 47a5adca90
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Add attack surface audit artifacts 
- Add advisory, entrypoint, and candidate scan outputs
- Capture dependency intelligence and cross-service attack surface notes
2026-05-28 05:13:36 -04:00

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Stage 08 Manual Attack Surface Probe Summary

Status: complete
Mode: single-team MVP
Inventory: piolium/attack-surface/manual-attack-surface-inventory.md

Sources reviewed

  • piolium/attack-surface/knowledge-base-report.md
  • piolium/attack-surface/candidates-summary.md
  • P3-P7 artifacts: public route authz matrix, source/sink flows, spec gap summary, state/concurrency summary
  • Source files for selected slices: services/api/src/index.ts, apps/web/app/api/admin/synthetic/**, apps/web/app/terminal.tsx, services/ingest-news/src/index.ts, docker-compose.yml

Inline hypotheses and verification

ID Reasoning Hypothesis Verification result Draft
H1 Backward If synthetic admin control is high-impact, look backward from writeSyntheticControlState to see whether every caller is authenticated as an admin user. Validated: API requires bearer token, but Next public route injects that token for any caller when enabled (shared.ts:25-55; route handlers at status/route.ts:5-7, control/route.ts:5-17; API mutation at index.ts:1380-1388). piolium/findings-draft/p8-001-public-next-admin-proxy-synthetic-control.md
H2 Backward If provider-controlled HTML can execute in the browser, trace from feed content to DOM sinks. Validated as fragile stored-XSS boundary: item.content becomes content_html (ingest-news/src/index.ts:76-96), regex sanitizer is used (terminal.tsx:1272-1287), then dangerouslySetInnerHTML (terminal.tsx:5008-5009). piolium/findings-draft/p8-002-provider-news-html-regex-sanitizer-xss.md
H3 Contradiction The system assumes infra is internal-only; check for a deployment artifact that contradicts this by publishing internal services. Validated: root compose publishes ClickHouse 8123/9000, Redis 6379, and NATS 4222/8222 without credentials/TLS/ACLs visible (docker-compose.yml:4-24). piolium/findings-draft/p8-003-root-compose-exposes-unauthenticated-infrastructure.md
H4 Contradiction The API relies on deployment perimeter for proprietary data; check whether WS route code enforces auth/origin if perimeter is absent. Validated: WS upgrades happen by path only (services/api/src/index.ts:1846-1936); live messages can subscribe and receive snapshots without auth (index.ts:1982-2008). piolium/findings-draft/p8-004-unauthenticated-websocket-market-streams.md

Coverage by slice

Slice Public routes / channels Attacker source Sink Result
Synthetic admin /api/admin/synthetic/*, /admin/synthetic/* Anonymous browser + feature/env enabled NATS KV synthetic control Finding drafted P8-001
News HTML /history/news, UI news drawer Provider item.content Browser DOM dangerouslySetInnerHTML Finding drafted P8-002
Infra services Host ports 8123, 9000, 6379, 4222, 8222 Network client ClickHouse/Redis/NATS Finding drafted P8-003
WebSockets /ws/*, /ws/live Anonymous WS client / cross-site browser Live broadcasts/snapshots Finding drafted P8-004
REST history/replay /history/*, /replay/* Anonymous HTTP query params ClickHouse query reads Already covered by previous P4/P5; not re-drafted except WS focus

Notes

  • Several P8 findings intentionally promote/refresh earlier P4-P7 candidates with manual file:line evidence, as requested for Stage 08 drafts.
  • No SQL injection was promoted in this pass; prior artifacts show query builders commonly use zod parsing, clamps, and quote helpers, while the higher-impact verified paths above had clearer exploitability.